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THE NIRVANA FALLACY IN LAW FIRM
REGULATION DEBATES
Elizabeth Chambliss ∗
“[L]awyers can no longer look back a generation for their managerial
models.” 1

Most commentators would agree that large law firms have outgrown
collegial management and self-regulation. With hundreds—and, in some
firms, thousands—of lawyers, 2 multiple national and international offices, 3
an increasing number of mergers, 4 and significant lateral mobility,5
partners no longer can rely on social ties and informal, face-to-face
interaction for making decisions, conveying firm policy, or monitoring the
quality of lawyers’ work. In the words of one managing partner: “In 1980,
we all knew each other and we knew each other’s spouses and we had
∗ Professor of Law, New York Law School. Thanks to Bruce Green and the Louis Stein
Center for inviting me to participate in this conference, and to Margaret Raymond for
indulging my excited (and belated) response to her paper. Thanks also to Tanina Rostain for
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Susan S. Samuelson, Strategic Planning, in LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT: A BUSINESS
APPROACH § 1.7, at 1:57 (Susan S. Samuelson ed., 1994).
2. In 2004, the 250 largest U.S. law firms ranged from 162 to 3,194 lawyers, and
fourteen firms had over 1000 lawyers. See The NLJ 250, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 15, 2004, at S16,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/lawChartNLJ250.jsp?id=1100137001977.
3. See The NLJ 250: Branch Offices, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 14, 2004, at S28 (reporting the
size and location of branch offices of the 250 largest firms nationwide); see also David
Hechler, As Economy Slows, So Does Firms’ Global Reach, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 15, 2004, at
S10 (reporting “rapid growth” in the number of law firms opening international offices since
2000); Nathan Koppel, Nation Builder, AM. LAW., Nov. 2004, at 84 (discussing Western
firms’ expansion into India).
4. See Leigh Jones, Training Leaders a Top Priority: Merged Firms Bring New
Challenges, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1 (reporting that Altman Weil, a law firm
consultant, counts 170 mergers since 2002); Aric Press & Susan Beck, Almost a Revolution,
AM. LAW., May 2004, at 77 (“According to consultant Brad Hildebrandt’s figures, 316 firms
merged between 1998 and 2003.”).
5. See Lateral Associates, PARTNERS’ REPORT FOR LAW FIRM OWNERS, June 2005, at 5
(reporting the results of a National Association for Law Placement survey that found that
lateral hiring of associates “increased by almost 8% between 2002 and 2003”); see also
Leigh Jones, Lawyers Moving to New Firms by the Group: “Cherry Picking” a Merger
Byproduct, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2005, at 1 (reporting lateral moves by groups of partners as
the result of increased merger activity).
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dinners on Saturday night. That was just a different world.” 6 Today, most
large law firms are more or less bureaucratically managed, 7 with extensive
internal hierarchy8 and specialized, full-time managers. 9
Lawyers generally have been slow to recognize the benefits of
bureaucratic management, and traditionally have resisted and lamented the
move toward more bureaucratic forms. 10 Although partners want their
firms to prosper in an increasingly competitive market, many decry the
strategies necessary to increase profitability and continue to express
nostalgia for an historic collegial ideal.11 Thus, many lawyers view the
infrastructure of bureaucratic management—that is, formal policies and
6. Vanessa Blum, In with the Old, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2000, at 40 (quoting Ann
Morgan Vickery, then managing partner of Hogan & Hartson’s D.C. office).
7. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 199-200 (1989) (describing how law
firms are moving toward bureaucratization of management due to growth in size and
complexity); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE LARGE LAW FIRM 86-124 (1988) (discussing law firms’ increasing tendency toward
bureaucratic organization and management).
8. See S. S. Samuelson & L. J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of Law Firm Profitability,
70 B.U. L. REV. 185, 197 (1990) (“Simple terms such as ‘partner’ and ‘associate’ must now
co-exist with ‘permanent associate,’ ‘non-equity partner,’ ‘of counsel,’ ‘staff attorney,’
‘junior partner,’ ‘senior attorney,’ and ‘participating associate,’ among others.”); Alison
Frankel, Veil of Tiers, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 92 (discussing the increase in multi-tier
partnerships).
9. See Behind the Scenes: D.C. Area Administrators on Bosses (Everyone), Budgets,
and Business, LEGAL TIMES, May 21, 2001, at 41 (discussing firms’ use of professional
managers); Mike France, Managing Partner: The Tender Trap, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at
A1 (“[A]lmost all [large firms] have one full-time (or nearly full-time) leader who sets
strategy, speaks to the press and hires lateral partners.”).
10. See NELSON, supra note 7, at 77-80, 205-28 (discussing lawyers’ ideological
resistance to bureaucratic management); Jonathan E. Smaby, Kicking the Habit of a
Reactive Approach, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at S3 (criticizing lawyers’ resistance to
centralized management and strategic planning).
11. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An
Empirical Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 146 (discussing
partners’ fears that becoming a limited liability partnership would result in a loss of
collegiality). “For some partners, particularly older partners, a loss of collegiality resembled
a form of nostalgia. These partners often lamented the increasing commercialization of law
practice and yearned for the days when all partners knew and trusted each other . . . .” Id.
See also Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial
Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 383 (1992) (reporting that lawyers “miss the collegiality,
cooperation and respect that may have been present in earlier eras of practice”); Marc
Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549,
550-52 (1996) (criticizing “nostalgia for the good old days” in “contemporary discourse
about law practice” and noting that such nostalgia “has been a constant accompaniment of
elite law practice at least since the formation of the large firm a hundred years ago”).
Apparently, this tendency toward nostalgia is not unique to American lawyers. See John
Leubsdorf, On the History of French Legal Ethics, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 341, 346
(2001) (noting that discussions of legal ethics in France are pervaded by nostalgic historical
narratives).
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procedures and specialized managerial personnel—as necessarily impeding
or distracting from some ‘purer’ form of collegial interaction and culture.12
Such thinking significantly inhibits the profession’s approach to lawyer
regulation. Despite the many thousands of lawyers who work in large law
firms, 13 and the broader institutional influence of large firm practice, 14 the
profession has yet to come up with a regulatory strategy aimed at large,
bureaucratic firms, 15 or even to agree that it needs one. Instead, many
lawyers, regulators, and scholars continue to ‘look back a generation’ for
their regulatory models, evaluating proposals aimed at large law firms
against a nostalgic, collegial ideal. 16
For instance, most of the debate about law firm discipline has revolved
around its likely effect on individual accountability and compliance with
ethical rules. Proponents of law firm discipline view it as a means of
promoting individual accountability, by promoting the development of
centralized monitoring and structural controls within firms. 17 Opponents of
12. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
691, 696-702 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure] (discussing
lawyers’ tendency to view law firm “structure” as separate from and opposed to “culture”);
Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 859-61 (1998) (discussing lawyers’ disdain for formal
supervisory structures).
13. Based on firms listed in the 2004-2005 NALP Directory of Legal Employers, there
are 31,836 partners, 43,205 associates, and 7,259 summer associates working in law firms
with 251 or more lawyers. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Women and
Attorneys of Color Continue to Make Only Small Gains at Large Law Firms (Nov. 5, 2004),
available at http://www.nalp.org/press/details.php?id=53.
14. As Nelson writes:
The large law firm sits atop the pyramid of prestige and power within the
American legal profession. Although comprising but a small fraction of lawyers,
through its impact on patterns of recruitment, styles of practice, and the collective
institutions of the bar, the large law firm has a significance that far exceeds the
number of lawyers it employs.
NELSON, supra note 7, at 1.
15. See Elizabeth Chambliss, MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategy for Entity
Regulation, 4 LEGAL ETHICS 45, 45 (2001) [hereinafter Chambliss, Institutional Strategy]
(arguing that the profession “has no coherent strategy” for the regulation of law firms as
entities); see also Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron,
37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017, 1029-30 (2004) (arguing that a “nostalgic, unified vision of
lawyers and the legal profession” has undermined efforts to regulate large firm practice);
Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit: Holding the Line on Litigation Conflicts
Through Federal Common Law, 16 REV. LITIG. 537, 565-66 (1997) (arguing that the Fifth
Circuit’s approach to judicial disqualification is “quixotic” as applied to sophisticated
business clients and the large law firms that represent them).
16. See supra note 1.
17. See Douglas N. Frenkel, Ethics: Beyond the Rules – Questions and Possible
Responses, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 875, 878 (1998) (calling for law firm discipline as a means
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law firm discipline, however, argue that extending supervisory liability to
firms will undermine individual accountability, viewing the centralization
of management as per se problematic. 18
In this volume, Professor Margaret Raymond raises similar concerns
about the role of compliance specialists in large law firms. 19 Proponents of
specialists, myself included, argue that the creation of specialized
management positions, such as ethics advisor and law firm general counsel,
will promote individual accountability by promoting ethical awareness and
monitoring within firms. 20 Professor Raymond, however, cautions that the
designation of a specialist to handle ethical and regulatory matters may lead
other lawyers to relax—or relinquish —individual responsibility. 21
This article questions the empirical basis for such concerns. I argue that
the fear that centralized management controls will undermine individual
accountability rests on an implicit comparison to a nostalgic, collegial
ideal, in which all partners engage in firm management and collective self-

of encouraging better monitoring among partners); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline
for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Professional
Discipline] (calling for the regulation of law firms as entities under professional disciplinary
rules).
18. Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to
Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 4 (2002) (stating that law firm
discipline “may actually undermine individual ethical incentives rather than furthering
attorney accountability”); see also Robert A. Creamer, Attorneys’ Liability Assurance
Soc’y, Inc., A Risk Retention Group, Comments Concerning Draft Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3
to the A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (July 6,
2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/creamer10.html [hereinafter Creamer, Comments]
(stating, “[a]ny shift from the individual responsibility of lawyers to the collective
responsibility of the firm” will undermine the deterrent value of disciplinary sanctions);
Robert A. Creamer, Joseph R. Lundy & Brian Redding, Attorneys’ Liability Assurance
Soc’y (“ALAS”), Inc., A Risk Retention Group, Testimony to the A.B.A. Ethics 2000
Commission (Feb. 15, 2001), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-witness_lundy.html
[hereinafter ALAS, Testimony] (“[A]ny change in the ethics rules that de-emphasizes in any
respect the individual responsibility of each lawyer to follow those rules, e.g., by shifting
responsibility to the firm, lessens, not increases, focus on the rules and will be
counterproductive . . . .”).
19. See Margaret Raymond, The Professionalization of Ethics, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. –
(2006).
20. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm
Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 346-50 (2003) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins,
Law Firm Discipline] (urging the ABA to promote the appointment of in-house ethics
specialists); Chambliss, Institutional Strategy, supra note 15, at 61-63 (same); see generally
Jonathan M. Epstein, Note, The In-House Ethics Advisor: Practical Benefits for the Modern
Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011 (1994) (explaining the benefits of in-house ethics
specialists).
21. Raymond, supra note 19 , at – (“Telling pressured and overwhelmed lawyers that
this area is, in effect, way too complex for them to master may cause them to lack
ownership of ethics principles.”).
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regulation. Since no large law firm can live up to this ideal, such a
comparison inevitably leads to a critique of the proposed regulation.
Economists refer to this type of comparison—between an idealized apple
and an imperfect orange—as the “nirvana fallacy.” 22
The proper comparison, I argue, is between actual, more or less
bureaucratic law firms, with and without the proposed controls. This type
of comparison requires close attention to current conditions in law firms
and lawyers’ attitudes and behavior in different regulatory contexts. To the
extent that such data are available, they suggest that some forms of
centralized management, such as the appointment of compliance
specialists, may significantly improve individual accountability and
compliance with professional rules.
Part I reviews the recent debate about law firm discipline and shows how
opponents of law firm discipline implicitly compare it with a collegial
ideal. Part II examines Professor Raymond’s concerns about the
professionalization of ethics and shows how she, too, relies in part on an
implicit collegial ideal. Part III reviews what little we know about the
effects of law firm regulation on individual accountability and compliance.
I conclude by defining some questions for future empirical research.
I.

LAW FIRM DISCIPLINE

Professor Ted Schneyer was the first to call for “professional discipline”
for law firms in a 1991 article by the same title.23 Professor Schneyer
called for the imposition of an entity duty of supervision under Rule
5.1(a), 24 which currently imposes supervisory duties only on individual
lawyers. 25 He argued that the possibility of sanctions against firms is

22. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (defining the nirvana fallacy). The nirvana fallacy “implicitly presents
the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional
arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution
approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional
arrangements.” Id.; see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 6-7 (1994) (criticizing “single
institutionalism,” in which the imperfections of one institution are used as evidence of the
virtues of another); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103
YALE L.J. 1219, 1229-30 (1994) (“[T]hrough the ‘nirvana fallacy,’ scholars erroneously
compare real-world institutions with some abstract or ideal institution . . . [that] has never
existed or . . . has been proven impossible to devise.”).
23. See generally Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 17.
24. Id. at 17-20, 23.
25. Rule 5.1(a) states:
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make
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necessary in the large firm context in order to encourage partners to invest
in firm management and the creation of bureaucratic controls, such as
ethics and conflicts committees. 26 He referred to such controls collectively
as the “ethical infrastructure” of the firm:
[A] law firm’s organization, policies, and operating procedures constitute
an “ethical infrastructure” that cuts across particular lawyers and
tasks . . . .
Given the . . . importance of a law firm’s ethical infrastructure and the
diffuse responsibility for creating and maintaining that infrastructure, a
disciplinary regime that targets only individual lawyers in an era of large
law firms is no longer sufficient. Sanctions against firms are needed as
well. 27

Professor Schneyer’s article prompted proposals for law firm discipline
in several jurisdictions,28 but only two—New York and New Jersey—have
imposed supervisory liability on firms. 29 The American Bar Association
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, more
commonly known as the Ethics 2000 Commission, included a proposal for
law firm discipline as part of its initial recommendations for changes to the
Model Rules, 30 but voted 6-5 to withdraw the proposal in response to
opposition. 31 The proposed rule would have added “the law firm” to the
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2002).
26. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 17, at 17.
27. Id. at 10-11.
28. See Mark Hansen, Taking a Firm Hand in Discipline: New York Ethics Rules
Pinpoint Law Firms – Some Say More States Should Follow, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at 24
(discussing New York’s adoption of law firm discipline and reporting that a similar proposal
was considered in California); see also Arthur Burger, Don’t Be Lulled by Firm Immunity,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at 27 (discussing the D.C Bar’s rejection of a proposal for law
firm discipline).
29. See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2004) (requiring law firms to make
“reasonable efforts to ensure that member lawyers . . . undertake measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct”); N.Y. CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(a) (2004) (requiring law firms to “make reasonable
efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to the disciplinary rules”).
30. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, A.B.A. ETHICS 2000 COMM’N, FINAL REPORT—
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2kmlove_article.html [hereinafter LOVE, FINAL REPORT] (reporting the Commission’s initial
support for law firm discipline).
31. See COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, A.B.A. CENTER
FOR
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, MINUTES (Mar. 16-17, 2001), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-03-16mtg.html (reporting the vote “to delete the references
to law firm discipline”).

CHRISTENSEN_CHAMBLISS

2005]

2/3/2011 10:08 PM

NIRVANA FALLACY

list of those with supervisory responsibility under Rule 5.1(a).
proposed rule stated:

107
The

A partner in a law firm, a lawyer who individually or together with other
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, and the
law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform
to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 32

Commentators have criticized law firm discipline on a number of
grounds, 33 but the key argument leading to the withdrawal of the Ethics
2000 Commission proposal was the concern that entity liability would
undermine individual accountability. As the Commission explained:
The Commission initially proposed to extend the duties in [Rule] 5.1 . . .
to law firms as well as individual lawyers. However, it became persuaded
that any possible benefit from being able to extend disciplinary liability
firm-wide was small when compared to the possible cost of allowing
responsible partners and supervisors to escape personal accountability. 34

It is not clear by what mechanism the Commission expected this tradeoff to occur.
Its language—“allowing responsible partners . . . to
escape” 35—suggests that the Commission was concerned about
enforcement; that the availability of the firm as a target would lead
disciplinary authorities to relax enforcement against individual lawyers.36
But this concern makes little sense given the historic absence of
enforcement against individual lawyers. Both proponents and opponents of

32. A.B.A. ETHICS 2000 COMM’N, NOVEMBER 2000 PUBLIC COMMENT DRAFT (emphasis
added) (on file with the author).
33. Some argue there is little evidence of ethical misconduct by firms. See, e.g.,
Symposium Transcript, How Should We Regulate Large Law Firms? Is a Law Firm
Disciplinary Rule the Answer?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 206 (2002) (remarks of
William P. Smith, III) (“If western democracy was being threatened by all these bad acts of
big firms . . . surely at least one of them would have committed a bad act, and we would
have a public case on the record as a result of this [New York] law firm discipline rule. But
we don’t.”); ALAS, Testimony, supra note 18 (“In our experience dealing with actual or
alleged misconduct by lawyers in ALAS firms, it is virtually never the case that the firm,
qua firm, is the problem.”). Others argue that the existing rules governing individuals are
effective. See, e.g., ALAS, Testimony, supra note 18 (“[T]he Reporter cites no instance in
which a state disciplinary authority was unable to deal effectively . . . [with] legal ethics
violations because of inability to prosecute a law firm.”). Finally, some criticize the use of
Rule 5.1 as the vehicle for entity regulation. See, e.g., Chambliss & Wilkins, Law Firm
Discipline, supra note 20, at 336-41 (criticizing the Rule 5.1 framework).
34. LOVE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 30.
35. Id.
36. See O’Sullivan, supra note 18, at 20 (arguing that law firm discipline would make it
“too easy for disciplinary authorities to pursue firms rather than invest the time, resources,
and effort needed to sanction a truly culpable lawyer”).
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law firm discipline agree that Rule 5.1(a) has been a disciplinary “dead
letter.” 37
The Commission also may have been concerned about shirking, that
extending supervisory liability to firms would encourage individual
partners to shirk their own supervisory duties. 38 But this concern, too, rests
on faulty assumptions. First, it assumes that partners’ investment in
supervision is influenced primarily by disciplinary rules, rather than the
firm’s management structure, compensation system, or firm leaders’
expectations. This is a problematic assumption by both sides in the law
firm discipline debate, to which I return in Part III.
The concern about shirking also assumes that lawyers cannot read
disciplinary rules, since extending supervisory liability to firms would not
eliminate individual liability. 39 For instance, Professor Julie O’Sullivan
argues that, against a history of non-enforcement against individual
lawyers, adding entity liability would signal that “enforcement authorities
are basically throwing in the towel as far as individual cases against large
firm lawyers are concerned.” 40 But if there was no enforcement to begin
with, what towel is there to be thrown?
Most important, for the present argument, the concern about shirking
assumes that, currently, most partners comply with the demands of Rule
5.1(a); that is, partners “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has
in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” 41 For instance, Professor
O’Sullivan argues that law firm discipline would lead “non-management
lawyers” to reduce their investment in building an “ethical superstructure”

37. Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis
Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 644 (1994) (referring to Rule
5.1(a)); see also O’Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1, 23 (acknowledging the lack of enforcement
of Rule 5.1(a)). One reason for the lack of enforcement of Rule 5.1(a) may be the limited
resources of most disciplinary agencies and the lack of demand for enforcement by large
firm clients. Id. at 58-62. Another reason may be the difficulty of pinpointing responsibility
for ethical lapses that occur in large firms. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra
note 17, at 11 (discussing “the evidentiary problems of pinning professional misconduct on
one or more members of a lawyering team”). Finally, some ethical lapses in large law firms
are “inherently structural,” such that there are no truly culpable individual lawyers. Id. at 25
(drawing an analogy to corporate wrongdoing).
38. See O’Sullivan, supra note 18, at 20-21 (suggesting that law firm discipline would
signal a “lack of personal responsibility for ethics compliance”).
39. Cf. Creamer, Comments, supra note 18 (stating that law firm discipline represents a
“shift from the individual responsibility of lawyers to the collective responsibility of the
firm”); ALAS, Testimony, supra note 18 (arguing that law firm discipline “shift[s]
responsibility to the firm”).
40. O’Sullivan, supra note 18, at 23.
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2002).
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in the firm 42—as if non-management lawyers currently make such an
investment.
None of these assumptions is supported by the data on law firm
management. Although Rule 5.1(a) makes all partners equally responsible
for maintaining the law firm’s ethical infrastructure, one would be hardpressed to find a large law firm that is actually managed that way. 43 Most
large law firms have moved away from decentralized, collegial governance
and instead have extensive management hierarchies, including some
number of professional (full-time, specialized) managers. 44 Thus, to the
extent that firm-wide monitoring occurs, it tends to be a centralized
management function.
Further, research suggests that most law firms do a relatively poor job of
monitoring firm-wide compliance with professional regulation.45 For
instance, while most firms have formal procedures for identifying conflicts
of interest, 46 many firms lack formal procedures for addressing other
ethical issues, such as lawyers’ investment in clients’ businesses 47 and the
withdrawal of client funds. 48 Most firms also lack billing guidelines other
than those imposed by clients 49 and do little or nothing to train new

42. O’Sullivan, supra note 18, at 23.
43. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Law Firm Discipline, supra note 20, at 339-40
(criticizing the theory of collective management reflected in Rule 5.1(a)).
44. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
45. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 696-702
(reviewing research on the development and effectiveness of ethical infrastructure within
law firms); Douglas N. Frenkel, et al., Robert L. Nelson & Austin Sarat, Bringing Legal
Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 704-05
(1998) (summarizing the main findings from focus groups with large firm litigators).
46. See Susan P. Shapiro, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LEGAL
PRACTICE 307-08 (2002) (reporting on conflicts detection procedures in 128 Illinois law
firms); Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Verité: Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth
About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 321-23 (1997) (reporting on
conflict screening procedures in thirty-one law firms in Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania and
Oregon); Stephen R. Volk et al., Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing
Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of Law Firms, 48 BUS. LAW. 1567, 1580 (1993)
(reporting on conflict detection procedures in twenty-six law firms).
47. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An
Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 284
(1997) [hereinafter Fortney, Law Firm Partners] (reporting that only half of 191 law firms
surveyed monitor partners’ investment in client business); Volk et al., supra note 46, at
1569 (reporting that only five of twenty-six firms require prior approval of stock trades).
48. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 47, at 284 (reporting that only thirtyfive percent of firms surveyed require a second partner signature for the withdrawal of client
firms); Volk et al., supra note 46, at 1575 (reporting that only ten of twenty-six firms
require a second signature).
49. See Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction,
Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239,

CHRISTENSEN_CHAMBLISS

110

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

2/3/2011 10:08 PM

[Vol. XXXIII

associates about proper billing procedures.50
Even firms that have formal procedures tend to do little to monitor
compliance. 51 A study of peer review procedures in 191 Texas law firms
found that most firms do not monitor partners’ compliance with internal
procedures other than those related to conflicts and billing, 52 and only half
of firms engage in any form of peer review. 53 Many partners view
monitoring by their colleagues as an affront. 54 And while most large law
firms have a partner or committee designated to handle ethical questions,55
typically such questions are viewed as a distraction from the primary
business of the firm. 56
Thus, there is little evidence that partners currently engage in the kind of
collegial self-governance imagined by opponents of law firm discipline.
Law firm discipline may not be the answer to inadequate supervision,57 but
it is hard to argue that law firm discipline could make matters worse. At
the very least, extending supervisory liability to firms could help focus
partners’ attention on the need for better internal monitoring. 58 More

253 (2000) [hereinafter Fortney, Soul for Sale] (reporting that sixty percent of 487
associates surveyed said that their firms lack formal billing guidelines other than those
imposed by clients).
50. Id. at 254 (reporting that twenty-six percent of associates received no instruction on
billing when they joined the firm and thirty-five percent received less than one hour of
instruction); see also Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense
Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 209-15 (1999) (discussing sixteen cases
of billing fraud by senior partners at prominent law firms).
51. See Frenkel et al., supra note 45, at 704 (reporting the “irrelevance of formal
mechanisms to lawyers’ daily discretionary judgments”).
52. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 47, at 284-85.
53. Id. at 289.
54. See Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’
Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 825 (1998) (quoting
a partner who said “one doesn’t monitor one’s partners”); Frenkel, supra note 17, at 878-79
(discussing the lack of “horizontal monitoring” among partners); Suchman, supra note 12, at
860 (reporting that partners “expressed quite a bit of ambivalence about whether formal
ethical control was the firm’s responsibility at all”).
55. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 47, at 289 (reporting that seventy-three
percent of firms have a principal or committee to handle ethical problems); Pizzimenti,
supra note 46, at 322 (reporting that most firms have ethics committees); Volk et al., supra
note 46, at 1578 (reporting that twenty-five of twenty-six firms have a “system” for dealing
with ethical concerns).
56. See Pizzimenti, supra note 46, at 322 (reporting that most ethics committees meet
only on an ad hoc basis); Suchman, supra note 12, at 864 (describing the ethics committee
as the “No Business Committee”).
57. See infra Part III (questioning the impact of disciplinary rules on managerial
practices in law firms).
58. See Frenkel, supra note 17, at 878 (calling for law firm discipline, despite its
“limitations and problems,” as a means of “providing colleague-monitoring incentives”).
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optimistically, such a change could provide momentum for the
“professionalization of ethics,” 59 which I argue is a more promising
strategy for law firm regulation.
II. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ETHICS
Some law firms have begun to address the gaps in internal supervision
by appointing individual partners to be specially responsible for monitoring
compliance with professional regulation.60 Such specialists go by a variety
of titles, such as “ethics advisor,” 61 “loss prevention partner,” 62 and,
increasingly, “general counsel,” 63 with some firms defining more than one
specialized position. 64 For simplicity’s sake, I refer to such specialists
collectively as “compliance specialists.” 65
The emergence of compliance specialists in large law firms in part
reflects firms’ increasing exposure to professional liability66 and insurers’
increasing insistence that firms improve their internal controls.67 Some

59. See Raymond, supra note 19, at JUMP CITE.
60. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 563-66 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance
Specialists] (examining the role of in-house compliance specialists in thirty-two law firms);
see also Jaime Levy, More Firms See Benefit of Using In-House General Counsel, CHI.
LAW., July 2004, at 28 (reporting firms’ increasing reliance on in-house counsel); Jonathan
D. Glater, In a Complex World, Even Lawyers Need Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at
C1; Leigh Jones, More Firms Hire General Counsel: GCs Help Reduce the Risk of Liability,
NAT’L L.J., June 6, 2005, at 1.
61. See generally Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics
Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2000) (referring to themselves as
ethics advisors); Epstein, supra note 20 (discussing in-house ethics advisors).
62. This is the title preferred by the ALAS for its liaisons. See Chambliss & Wilkins,
Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 560 n.4.
63. See Levy, supra note 60; Jones, supra note 60;; see also Nancy Rubin Stuart, A
Lawyer’s Lawyer: More Firms Establish In-House General Counsel Positions, N.J.L.J.,
June 20, 2005, at 27 (discussing firms’ appointment of in-house general counsel); Charles
Toutant, General Counsel Posts Popping up at Large Firms, Spurred by Insurers, N.J.L.J.,
Nov. 15, 2004, at 1 (noting firms’ increased selection of general counsel from within the
firm).
64. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 565-66
(reporting the most common titles in a sample of thirty-two law firms).
65. Id. at 563-65 (defining “compliance specialist” as a unit of analysis). This
functional label is theoretically useful but empirically inaccurate. Law firms do not refer to
their in-house specialists as “compliance specialists.”
66. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 1012, 1030-31 (discussing the “growth in the number
and size of awards for legal malpractice”); Gary Taylor, Counsel to Firms Goes In-House:
Legal Costs Are Leading Firms, Like Their Clients, to Look Inside for Advice, NAT’L L.J.,
July 18, 1994, at A1 (discussing firms’ increasing vulnerability to malpractice claims).
67. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 559-60, 590;
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insurers, such as the Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (“ALAS”),
require firms to designate a partner to act as a liaison to the insurer, 68 and
over time such partners may take on various compliance functions.69
Insurers may even offer discounts to firms that have in-house compliance
specialists. 70
The emergence of compliance specialists is also part of a broader trend
toward the professionalization of law firm management; that is, the
treatment of management as a full-time job requiring its own special skills.
Until recently, most law firms were run by practicing partners who
managed on the side, 71 and some large law firms continue to be run that
way. 72 These days, however, most large law firms are run by full-time
managing partners who leave practice, 73 sometimes forever, 74 to fill this
increasingly specialized role. Some firms have even begun to send their
Levy, supra note 60; Glater, supra note 60; Toutant, supra note 63 (discussing the role of
liability insurers in promoting risk management within firms).
68. ALAS has played an important role in promoting the formal appointment of inhouse compliance specialists. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Law Firm Discipline, supra note
20, at 347 (discussing ALAS’s role).
69. Id. at 348. As one partner observed, “Being anointed the ALAS representative does
not require you to know anything about ethics . . . but once you are named [the loss
prevention partner], it’s hard to avoid some involvement.” Id.
70. See Levy, supra note 60 (reporting the availability of discounts); Glater, supra note
60 (same).
71. See NELSON, supra note 7, at 74 (noting that law firm managers traditionally have
had tenure in the firm and access to clients, distinguishing them from corporate and
industrial managers, who have neither).
72. See The Not-So-Fun Part; Firm Leaders Share What Aspects of Their Job They Find
the Most Challenging, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at 31 (reporting the challenges faced by
managing partners at nine large Washington D.C. firms). According to Richard Wiley of
Wiley Rein & Fielding, “[M]anaging our firm while also engaging in the active practice of
law . . . amounts to two full-time positions.” Id.
73. See James Jones & Carl Leonard, The Price of Leadership: A New Look at Setting
Compensation for Managing Partners, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 2002, at 5 (noting that “in larger
firms . . . the managing partner’s job is usually a full-time position” and that “most
managing partners . . . serve five to seven years”); see also France, supra note 9 (reporting
that most large law firms have full-time managing partners).
74. It can be difficult to return to practice after spending five or more years away from it
and firms struggle with how to compensate ex-managers while they rebuild their practices.
See Jones & Leonard, supra note 73; What Your Partners Should Know About Their
Compensation, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFFICES, Jan. 2002, at 3 (discussing
compensation for managing partners). Some managing partners decide not to return to
practice and go on to other law-related careers. See, e.g. Briefly, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 13, 1995,
at A5 (reporting that James W. Jones, who managed D.C.’s Arnold & Porter for eight years,
was stepping down to become vice chairman of APCO Associates Inc., a public relations
and lobbying firm that he helped found as an Arnold & Porter subsidiary). Jones is now a
law firm consultant. See Terry Carter, Homegrown v. Lateral: In the Race to Partnership,
Both Have Advantages, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2005, at 30 (quoting Jones and identifying him as a
law firm consultant ).
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partners to business school, teaming up with leading universities for short
courses on law firm management. 75 Within this context, it is no surprise
that some firms have begun to define additional management specialties,
such as ethics advisor and firm general counsel.
There are no systematic data on the prevalence of compliance specialists
within law firms, but most evidence suggests that their number is
increasing. A 2004 survey of AmLaw 200 law firms 76 by Altman Weil, a
law firm consultant, found that thirty-five of the fifty-six firms that
responded have “in-house general counsel”; typically, “a partner who
spends just under half of his/her time in that function.” 77 A follow-up
survey of the AmLaw 200 in 2005 found that fifty-three of seventy-seven
firms have in-house general counsel (sixty-nine percent), almost a third of
whom are full time in that role.78 In most firms, the primary role of inhouse counsel is to advise firm management about general and professional
liability issues and to oversee the firm’s conflicts function.79
Professor Raymond views firms’ increasing reliance on in-house
compliance specialists with ambivalence. Although she acknowledges the
many benefits of devoting special attention to professional ethics,80 she
shares with opponents of law firm discipline a distrust of centralized
75. See Leigh Jones, Training Leaders a Top Priority: Merged Firms Bring New
Challenges, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1 (describing law firm management training
programs at Harvard Business School, University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of
Business, and Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management). The per-partner
cost of such programs, which may be specifically tailored to each firm, can run “into the
tens of thousands of dollars,” plus the loss of each partner’s billings. Id.
76. AmLaw200 firms are the 200 top-grossing U.S. law firms, as measured by The
American Lawyer. See John O’Connor, A Guide to Our Methodology, AM. LAW., Aug.
2005, at 89.
77. Press Release, Altman Weil, Inc., Majority of Major U.S. Law Firms Have In-House
General
Counsel,
Survey
Reports
(Mar.
25,
2004),
available
at
http://www.altmanweil.com/news/release.cfm?PRID=38 (“[A]lmost two-thirds of those
responding (62.5%) have an in-house General Counsel . . . .”); see also ALTMAN WEIL, INC.,
RESULTS OF CONFIDENTIAL “FLASH” SURVEY ON LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL (2005),
http://www.altmanweil.com/pdf/2005LawFirmGCSurvey.pdf [hereinafter ALTMAN WEIL,
2005 SURVEY] (reporting that fifty-six firms responded to the 2004 survey).
78. See ALTMAN WEIL, 2005 SURVEY, supra note 77, at 1, 3; see also Chambliss &
Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 573 (reporting that ten of the twenty-nine
specialists for whom data were available, or thirty-four percent, were full-time in that role).
79. See Press Release, Altman Weil, Inc., New Survey Reports on General Counsel in
Law
Firms
(May
24,
2005),
available
at
http://www.altmanweil.com/news/release.cfm?PRID=51 (noting the growing importance of
conflicts management due to increased merger activity); see also Chambliss & Wilkins,
Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 573 (finding that most compliance specialists’
core substantive jurisdiction is conflicts).
80. See Raymond, supra note 19, at – (calling the emergence of in-house ethics
specialists “a significant positive development”).
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strategies for promoting compliance with ethical rules. According to
Professor Raymond, firms’ reliance on specialists, coupled with the
increasing complexity of the rules, risks alienating non-specialists from
professional values and causing “pressured and overwhelmed lawyers” to
“lack ownership of ethics principles.” 81
Professor Raymond suggests several mechanisms by which such
alienation could occur. First, like the opponents of law firm discipline, she
is concerned about shirking. 82 Given the increasing pressure on lawyers to
work quickly and specialize narrowly, Professor Raymond worries that the
presence of an ethics specialist will encourage non-specialists to relinquish
their own ethical responsibilities.83 According to Professor Raymond, the
presence of a specialist signals that “someone else is developing expertise
so you don’t have to,” and “runs the risk of . . . taking ethical issues out of
mainstream discourse.” 84
Professor Raymond also is concerned about the socialization of new
lawyers. She fears that firms’ increasing reliance on specialists and the
increasing complexity of the rules will lead new lawyers to view ethics as
“just another area of specialization”85 that is “way too complex for them to
master,” 86 rather than an integral part of their own practice. Further, given
firms’ tendency to undercompensate specialists,87 Professor Raymond
notes that “the development of ethics expertise probably looks to junior
lawyers like a specialization best avoided.” 88
Finally, Professor Raymond is worried about non-specialists’ ethics
education and training. As she notes, certain ethical responsibilities cannot
be fully delegated to specialists, such as the radar required to spot ethical
issues and the awareness that consultation is needed.89 While most firms
have expanded formal training, including formal ethics training, Professor
Raymond worries that such training “may be substituting for more informal
opportunities for hands-on participation and mentoring that may have been
more prevalent in the past.” 90 Thus, she concludes, “[w]hile the

81. Id. at —.
82. Id. at —.
83. Id. at —.
84. Id. at —.
85. Id. at —.
86. Id. at —.
87. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 572-74
(reporting that some lawyers volunteer as many as 500 hours per year to in-house ethics
advising).
88. Raymond, supra note 19, at —.
89. Id. at —
90. Id. at —; see also Suchman, supra note 12, at 862-63 (discussing associates’
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development of an institutional infrastructure of expertise is undoubtedly
beneficial, we need to consider carefully how to maintain the connection of
new lawyers to their own ethical responsibilities.”91
Professor Raymond raises important questions about the potential tradeoff between the role of specialists and individual lawyers’ awareness of and
compliance with ethical rules. Like opponents of law firm discipline, she
questions whether centralized management necessarily will improve
individual conduct and accountability within firms. Her focus on the
socialization of junior lawyers is particularly helpful, given that the effects
of centralization, including the role of compliance specialists, may be very
different for associates than for partners. 92
One must be careful, however, to separate questions about the role of
compliance specialists from more general concerns about the pace and
culture of practice in large law firms. Most of the conditions that Professor
Raymond describes—the need for speed,93 the pressure to specialize,94
and the growing isolation of associates 95—are true of large law firms
generally, whether or not they have in-house compliance specialists.96
Likewise, much of the alienation from legal ethics that she fears will result
from specialists, via shirking, avoidance, and inadequate training, is already
present in many firms. 97
For instance, Professor Raymond’s concern that the presence of
specialists will “[take] ethical issues out of mainstream discourse”98
implies that ethical issues currently are part of mainstream discourse. Yet
Professor Raymond’s own analysis suggests that this is not the case.

dissatisfaction with the quality and timing of formal training).
91. Raymond, supra note 19, at —.
92. See Frenkel et al., supra note 45, at 705 (reporting “widely divergent perceptions of
senior and junior lawyers about the climate in their firms and the prescription for addressing
problems”); Sarat, supra note 54, at 826 (“[T]he world of the firm seems quite different
from the perspective of associates than it does from the perspective of partners.”).
93. See Raymond, supra note 19, at —.
94. Id. at —.
95. Id. at —.
96. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV., 709, 717 (1998) (reporting that large firm lawyers are
overburdened and there is “no time to think”); Suchman, supra note 12, at 869 (noting the
absence of associate mentoring); William J. Wernz, The Ethics of Large Law Firms—
Responses and Reflections, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 197 (2002) (noting the pressure to
specialize).
97. See Frenkel et al., supra note 45, at 705 (noting lawyers’ “avoidance or suspicion of
any moral calculus in their daily choices”); Suchman, supra note 12, at 858-59 (reporting
that large firms conduct “very little routine ethical evaluation” and that “formal . . . controls
on ethicality . . . are remarkably weak”).
98. Raymond, supra note 19, at –.
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According to Professor Raymond, junior lawyers currently are isolated,
unmentored, and lack “a venue for dialogue and engagement on ethical
issues.” 99 Instead, they are left to learn their ethical norms “by observing
their colleagues in the wild.” 100
Similarly, Professor Raymond’s concern that the presence of an
undervalued specialist will send the wrong message to associates could be
read to suggest that the absence of a specialist might be preferable. To be
fair, this is not Professor Raymond’s explicit argument. On the contrary,
she urges firms to ensure that ethics specialists receive “adequate
compensation, institutional respect, and appropriate authority” 101 so as to
send the message that ethics are important.102 Implicitly, however,
Professor Raymond seems to blame specialists, and other formal
infrastructure associated with the professionalization of ethics, for the very
conditions that specialists are meant to address.
She opens her article by contrasting the “professionalization of ethics”
with “connecting all practitioners to the values of professional
responsibility,” as if the two are necessarily opposed. 103 She argues that
the “creation of ethics specialists . . . may pose some challenges to the
continuing goal of individual ethics awareness,”104 as if those challenges
would not otherwise be present. She notes that “we should be profoundly
concerned if the professionalization of ethics results in less individual
connection to professional responsibility.” 105 And, like the opponents of
law firm discipline, she compares the fast-paced and complex world of
specialists to an earlier, simpler time, when lawyers were less accessible to
clients 106 and ethics rules were more accessible to lawyers. 107
99. Id. at —; see also Suchman, supra note 12, at 864 (noting that increasingly costconscious clients “will no longer subsidize apprenticeship, socialization, or indulge ethical
back-talk”).
100. Raymond, supra note 19, at – (citing Suchman, supra note 12, at 869).
101. Id. at —.
102. I agree. See Chambliss, Institutional Strategy, supra note 15, at 61-62 (urging
professional associations to promote the authority of in-house ethics specialists); Chambliss
& Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 589 (emphasizing the importance of
“economic incentives and visible management support” for in-house specialists); see also
Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 174849 (2005) [hereinafter Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege] (arguing that the scope of the attorneyclient privilege between firm counsel and other members of the firm should turn in part on
whether firm counsel is compensated for in-house service).
103. Raymond, supra note 19, at – (“The current versions of our ethical rules and the
structure of law firms have the potential to encourage the professionalization of ethics rather
than connecting all practitioners to the values of professional responsibility.”).
104. Id. at —.
105. Id, at —.
106. Id. at – (ruing the “newly developed expectation that lawyers are constantly
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I do not mean to suggest that Professor Raymond’s concerns about the
potential drawbacks of specialists are necessarily misplaced. On the
contrary, I applaud her attention to the challenging conditions of practice in
large law firms and share her concerns about promoting ethical awareness
among lawyers. My point is merely to call attention to her implicit
standard of comparison and to the prevalence of this standard in current
regulatory debates.
Probably we all can agree on the virtues of the collegial ideal, in which
lawyers get informal, hands-on training, opportunities for collaborative
work, and time for dialogue and engagement on ethical issues. But this is
not a fair standard for evaluating the role of specialists or any other
proposal for improving professional self-regulation in large, bureaucratic
law firms. The choice is not between specialists and individual ethical
engagement. The choice, rather, is between big firms with specialists and
big firms without specialists. Thus, rather than comparing the role of
specialists to our collective ideal, the role of specialists and other strategies
for law firm regulation must be evaluated “in the wild,” 108 and compared to
their realistic, imperfect alternatives.
III. THE EFFECTS OF LAW FIRM REGULATION ON INDIVIDUAL
COMPLIANCE
The arguments for law firm discipline, in-house compliance specialists,
and other forms of law firm regulation do not stand or fall on the issue of
individual compliance. Just as certain individual ethical and legal duties
are “nondelegable,” 109 proponents of law firm regulation argue that law
firm management has nondelegable duties as well.110

accessible and available around the clock”).
107. Id. at – (noting that the 1908 Canons of ethics covered “about nine pages,” and
arguing that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct “have gotten too dense and complex
to be relevant to the average lawyer”).
108. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
109. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126-27 (1989) (holding
that the purpose of Rule 11 was “to bring home to the individual signer his personal,
nondelegable responsibility” to prevent frivolous motions). In response to Pavelic,
Congress amended Rule 11 to provide for entity liability. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (allowing
sanctions for a violation of the Rule to be imposed “upon the attorneys, law firms, or
parties” responsible).
110. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 17, at 25 (arguing that some
forms of wrongdoing are “inherently structural”); see also Chambliss & Wilkins, Law Firm
Discipline, supra note 20, at 336-38 (arguing that the design and monitoring of structural
controls in large law firms is a management, not individual, duty); Chambliss, Institutional
Strategy, supra note 15, at 48 (“[M]any of the ethical issues large firm lawyers face . . . are
matters governed by firm-wide policy rather than individual decision-making.”).
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In large law firms, for instance, some ethical rules, such as the rules
governing conflicts of interest and the management of client funds, could
not possibly be observed without some form of centralized management.111
Law firm management likewise is responsible for personnel decisions,
marketing decisions, and a host of other business decisions that have
ethical and legal implications. 112 In most firms, no individual lawyer
controls such decisions or can be held accountable for them. Thus, one can
argue in favor of regulating large law firms without making any claims
about the effect of such regulation on individual compliance. 113
Nevertheless, a key argument for law firm discipline, in-house
specialists, and other efforts to improve law firm management is that better
management will promote individual accountability and compliance within
firms. By what mechanisms do proponents of law firm regulation expect
this to occur?
A.

Two Models of Regulation
1.

The Legalistic Model

There are two different models of regulation at work in this debate. The
first, which predominates among both proponents and opponents of law
firm discipline, is what might be called a “legalistic” model. This model
emphasizes the content of formal rules and the direct enforcement of those
rules as the chief determinants of lawyers’ conduct.114 The legalistic model

111. Rule 5.1(a) as currently written recognizes the need for centralized management in
these areas. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 2 (2002) (stating that Rule
5.1(a) requires lawyers with managerial responsibility to establish “internal policies and
procedures” to “detect and resolve conflicts of interest . . . [and] account for client funds and
property”).
112. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 575-76
(discussing the types of matters handled by in-house compliance specialists); Jarvis &
Fucile, supra note 61, at 108-11 (discussing the types of matters the authors handled as inhouse ethics advisors); see also ALTMAN WEIL, 2005 SURVEY, supra note 77, at 6, 8-11
(reporting the types of matters about which in-house general counsel advise their firms).
113. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Law Firm Discipline, supra note 20, at 338 (“The
primary purpose of law firm discipline is to promote compliance efforts by firms; thus,
firms—not individuals—are the object of regulation.”).
114. This model is common among lawyers, who are taught to assume the centrality of
legal rules. Elizabeth Chambliss & Lauren B. Edelman, Sociological Perspectives on Equal
Employment Law, at 1 (May 24, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(discussing “legal” versus “sociological” models of equal employment opportunity
regulation); see also Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 703
(“[L]egal ethics scholars and bar regulators tend to focus on the content of formal rules and
the scope of potential liability . . . .”).
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tends to portray lawyers as “bad men,” in Holmes’ terms; 115 that is, as
tending toward noncompliance in the absence of direct enforcement.
For instance, Professor Schneyer begins his article on law firm discipline
by citing five examples of misconduct in large law firms. 116 He uses these
examples to argue that individual discipline is inadequate and that
“[s]anctions against firms” 117 are needed in order to enable enforcement of
Rule 5.1(a). 118 According to Professor Schneyer, the threat of sanctions
against firms will encourage firms to improve their internal controls, which
in turn will promote individual compliance (by reducing individual
misconduct). 119 Thus, Professor Schneyer’s regulatory model looks
something like this: (1) changing Rule 5.1(a) will increase the threat of
enforcement; (2) the threat of enforcement will prompt better management;
and (3) better management will reduce misconduct.
Opponents of law firm discipline do not question this legalistic
regulatory model; instead, they question whether the threat of enforcement
will, in fact, prompt better management. According to opponents, the
threat of enforcement against firms will undermine individual incentives to
manage. 120 Like Professor Schneyer, however, opponents emphasize the
importance of formal liability rules, and the centrality of disciplinary
enforcement in shaping partners’ incentives to manage. 121
2. The Institutional Model
The promotion of compliance specialists is based on an “institutional”
model of regulation.122 The institutional model views firm culture as the
115. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897) (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict,
not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it,
in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).
116. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 17, at 1. This focus on
misconduct and noncompliance is typical among law firm discipline proponents. See
Chambliss & Wilkins, Law Firm Discipline, supra note 20, at 337 (criticizing proponents’
focus on individual, intentional misconduct).
117. Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 17, at 11.
118. Id. at 8-11, 20. Schneyer argues that the nature of large firm practice makes
individual discipline difficult, and that “if we are to pursue the regulatory aims of MR
5.1(a) . . . [we] may have to give disciplinary authorities the options of fining or censuring
the firm . . . .” Id.
119. Id. at 12 (“A disciplinary system for law firms . . . could promote firm practices that
reduce the risk not only of discipline but also of civil liability, disqualification, and other
nondisciplinary sanctions.”).
120. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 18, at 41-43.
122. See Chambliss, Institutional Strategy, supra note 15, at 56-64 (explaining the
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primary determinant of lawyers’ conduct, rather than formal rules or direct
disciplinary enforcement.123 The institutional model does not deny the
importance of direct enforcement (where it exists), but argues that, in the
absence of full enforcement, individual conduct is driven primarily by
cultural norms and expectations.124
The institutional model does not assume that individual lawyers are
resistant to compliance; on the contrary, it assumes that most lawyers
conform to the norms and expectations of their firms—including the firm’s
definition of “compliance.” 125 Thus, the institutional model depicts
lawyers as tending toward compliance with professional regulation (though
the meaning of “compliance” may be contested). 126
The institutional model views in-house specialists as a powerful
mechanism for promoting conformity between local and formal standards
for compliance. 127 Specialists tend to serve as conduits for information
about formal standards and to promote the development of compliance
procedures within firms. 128 Moreover, to the extent that in-house
institutional theory of organizations and its implications for the regulation of law and other
professional firms).
123. Id. at 56 (discussing institutional theory’s emphasis on cultural versus material
concerns); see also Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of
Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 484-506 (1997) [hereinafter Edelman & Suchman,
Legal Environments] (contrasting “material” versus “cultural” theories of organizations).
Although the institutional model is primarily associated with the regulation of organizations,
its emphasis on cultural determinants applies to individuals as well. See Mark Suchman &
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and
Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 903, 922-23 (1996) (arguing that there is
considerable empirical support for the notion that “compliant behavior is motivated more by
cultural norms and accounts than by the imminent threat of legal sanctions”).
124. The role of culture is greatest where legal rules are ambiguous. See Edelman &
Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 123, at 501-02 (“If all legal doctrine were
substantive and unequivocal and if all legal implementation were coercive and undeviating,
then one could imagine a simple feedback loop, in which organizations would adjust their
behaviors exclusively in response to existing laws . . . . In the [institutional] account,
however, the plot-line is much messier than this.”).
125. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 714 (stating that
“consistent with its emphasis on cultural norms and expectations,” institutional theory
assumes that most lawyers seek compliance with professional rules).
126. Id.
127. See Chambliss, Institutional Strategy, supra note 15, at 60-63 (emphasizing the role
of in-house specialists in promoting regulatory compliance within firms); Chambliss &
Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 560 (“From a regulatory standpoint, the
emergence of in-house compliance specialists is a pivotal development.”).
128. See e.g., Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 560 n.11
(reviewing research on the role of compliance specialists in promoting internal compliance
procedures); Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 123, at 498-501 (same);
see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 74-79 (1992) (arguing that compliance
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specialists organize into external networks, they may play a powerful role
in defining industry standards for compliance, 129 which in turn may affect
formal standards. 130
Specialists need not act like cops to promote compliance. Although
some corporate counsel play the role of “cop” in their firms, 131 and some
law firm counsel may do so as well (though most tend to downplay this
role), 132 specialists’ influence on individual compliance does not depend
on direct enforcement of ethics rules or firm policy. As explained above,
the institutional model does not rely on direct enforcement. Instead, the
institutional model emphasizes the cultural influence of specialists and their
role in educating and socializing firm members.
For instance, from an institutional perspective, the mere appointment of
a compliance specialist is a cultural statement by the firm. 133 As Professor
Raymond points out, it may be the wrong statement: if the specialist is
incompetent, or undervalued, or has no preexisting authority in the firm,
the appointment may be “merely symbolic,”134 signifying management’s
disrespect for the job. 135 Such an appointment could drive firm culture
even further from formal standards.
Even merely symbolic appointments may take on a life of their own,
however, such that management’s values are not ultimately determinative

specialists have a professional incentive to promote internal compliance procedures even in
the absence of a significant legal threat).
129. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 711 (discussing
the role of specialist networks); Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note
60, at 561 n.12 (citing research on the role of professional networks in shaping industry
standards for compliance).
130. See Chambliss, Institutional Strategy, supra note 15, at 59 (arguing that where
formal standards are ambiguous, regulators tend to take their cues from industry norms and
practices); see also Chambliss & Edelman, supra note 114, at 26-28 (reviewing research
supporting this point).
131. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457,
462-64 (2000) (discussing corporate counsel who “are primarily concerned with policing the
conduct of their business clients”).
132. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 587-88
(quoting several in-house specialists on this point). “If you say no all the time, people will
go underground,” said one specialist. Id. at 588.
133. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 713 (arguing that
the creation of internal compliance structures is culturally significant whether or not such
structures are effective).
134. “Merely symbolic” structures are those that an employer creates without providing
the resources to make them effective. See Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen M. Petterson,
Symbols and Substance in Organizational Response to Civil Rights Law, 17 RESEARCH SOC.
STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 107, 109 (1999).
135. See Raymond, supra note 19, at —.
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of the specialist’s influence. 136 For instance, if the specialist is personally
committed to promoting compliance with formal rules, a merely symbolic
appointment may lead to conflict, mobilizing previously passive
constituents inside and outside the firm. 137 Or, if the specialist is part of an
external professional network, the specialist may be able to draw on that
network to challenge local culture. 138 Or, if the specialist becomes
frustrated and quits (or is fired), the specialist may carry tales of the firm to
competitors, clients, and potential recruits, thus imposing reputation
costs. 139
Of course, specialists’ power to promote compliance with formal rules
and policy typically will be greater when law firm management invests in
and supports the specialist, making clear that management values
compliance. 140 The nature of specialists’ influence also depends on
specialists’ own commitments. If specialists are captive to deviant interests
or simply shills for bad managers, their positive effect on firm culture
obviously will be diminished. 141
The point is, from an institutional perspective, these are the central
variables of interest—the firm’s investment, the specialist’s commitment,
and the make-up of internal and external constituencies—rather than the
content of formal rules or the threat of liability. The institutional model
focuses on the dynamics of cultural change within firms and treats the firm

136. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance:
Affirmative Action Officers’ Dilemma, 13 LAW & POL’Y 73, 75 (1991) (arguing that, once
implemented, symbolic structures tend to take on a life of their own); see also Lauren B.
Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the
Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 981 (1999) (“[E]ven
‘merely symbolic’ compliance can exert lasting substantive effects as it redirects
organizational attention, alters the organization’s public identity, and draws new sets of
participants into the organization’s dominant coalition.”).
137. See Edelman et al., supra note 136, at 75 (discussing the role of politically
motivated specialists); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of
Conflict, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 23-33 (1996) [hereinafter Chambliss, Title
VII] (discussing conflicts between affirmative action officers and their employers).
138. For instance, a lawyer who acts as a liaison to the firm’s liability insurer may be able
to use the insurer’s requirements to motivate changes in the firm. See Chambliss & Wilkins,
Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 590 (discussing the role of ALAS in creating
networks among in-house specialists).
139. See Chambliss, Title VII, supra note 137, at 33-40 (discussing the negative publicity
that resulted after the City of Madison, Wisconsin fired a vocal affirmative action officer).
140. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 582 (“[T]he
most important source of credibility for . . . [in-house] specialists is the visible support of
firm leaders.”).
141. See Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege, supra note 102, at 1766-67 (urging ongoing
research on the role of firm in-house counsel and cautioning against blind support).
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as the central arena—and agent—of professional regulation. 142
B.

Empirical Findings

In the present context, neither model has any direct empirical support.
Only two states have imposed law firm discipline 143 and no one has
systematically studied the consequences.144 And while I and others have
begun to study the role of compliance specialists in large law firms, 145 no
one has attempted to measure how in-house specialists affect individual
compliance.
Further, given the obstacles to measuring compliance, direct evidence
would be difficult to produce. Like deterrence, compliance is measured by
its absence, rather than being directly observable.146 And since lawyers
cannot be expected to report their own noncompliance, or allow researchers
to observe it, 147 even noncompliance would be difficult to measure in any
systematic way. 148
142. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The
Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 177, 198-202 (Robert L. Nelson et
al. eds., 1992) (arguing that the workplace is a central arena for the formation of
professional ideology and that “different practice contexts exhibit fundamentally different
conceptions of appropriate professional conduct”).
143. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
144. See O’Sullivan, supra note 18, at 21-22. O’Sullivan notes that “[w]e are
operating . . . in an empirical vacuum” as to the effects of law firm discipline. Id. at 22.
145. See generally Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60
(reporting the findings from focus groups with compliance specialists in thirty-two law
firms); Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 61 (reporting their own experience as compliance
specialists).
146. On the difficulties of measuring deterrence, see Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the
Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32
EMORY L.J. 937, 944 (1983) (“The question of . . . deterrence is always
counterfactual . . . .”). On the difficulties of measuring compliance, see William Bradford,
In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243,
1245 (2004) (“Whether, and, if so, why states elect to comply with international law are
now the most central questions within the international legal academy . . . .”); Gregory
Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517,
1555-61 (2004) (questioning legal scholars’ use of single-observation case studies, such as
the Enron scandal, to generate causal explanations for corporate compliance and
noncompliance).
147. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 586 (reporting
compliance specialists’ resistance to direct observation).
148. See Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyer’s Response to Organizational
Professional Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House
Counsel, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 246 (2002) (“[E]mpirical ethics research is . . . notoriously
difficult.”). See generally Andrew Crane, Are You Ethical? Please Tick Yes or No: On
Researching Ethics in Business Organizations, 20 J. BUS. ETHICS 237 (1999) (critically
reviewing the current state of empirical ethics research).
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We do know a few things about lawyers’ attitudes and behavior,
however, that tend to suggest some limits of the legalistic model. For
instance, we know that formal ethics rules and their enforcement through
lawyer discipline tend to have little direct effect on lawyers’ day-to-day
conduct. Professor Schneyer argues that this is true in large law firms
because disciplinary enforcement historically has been weak or nonexistent in that context. 149 Recent research suggests, however, that the
ethics rules and the threat of disciplinary enforcement play a relatively
marginal role even where disciplinary enforcement is strongest; that is,
among solo and small firm practitioners.150
In her 2004 study of ethical decision-making among solo and small-firm
practitioners, 151 Professor Leslie Levin reports that “many of the lawyers I
interviewed did not appear to think much about the ethical issues they
encountered in their day-to-day work lives,” 152 or “consider the issues they
confronted in moral or ethical terms.” 153 To the extent that lawyers did
recognize questions as “ethical,” and seek answers, they tended to rely on
other lawyers for advice, 154 or on a “stock response” developed in their
initial years of practice, 155 rather than researching the rule. According to
Professor Levin:
[T]he lawyers I interviewed indicated that they rarely consulted bar codes
when deciding how to handle ethical issues. . . . Many freely admitted that
they did not keep up-to-date on changes in the New York Code and that
they had not consulted it since law school. . . . Many lawyers maintained
the attitude that they need not consult the New York Code or other ethical
rules because they considered themselves ethical or they “know what to
do.” 156

149. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 17, at 6-13 (summarizing the
obstacles to disciplinary enforcement in the large firm context).
150. See Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004) [hereinafter Levin, Small Firm Practitioners] (noting that
“[s]olo and small firm lawyers are disciplined at a far greater rate than other lawyers,” and
presenting evidence from a variety of sources); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL.,
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1148 (4th ed. 2005) (reviewing statistics on
disciplinary enforcement).
151. Levin’s random sample covered forty-one lawyers who practice in the New York
City metropolitan area. See Levin, Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 150, at 318-20
(describing her sample and methods).
152. Id. at 335.
153. Id. at 336.
154. Id. at 362-64 (reporting the strategies used by new lawyers).
155. Id. at 364-66 (emphasizing the importance of lawyers’ early experiences on
subsequent responses).
156. Id. at 368-69.
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Professor Levin’s findings are consistent with the findings from large
law firms, discussed in Part II, showing that large firm lawyers typically
devote little time or attention to ethical issues 157 and tend to view such
issues as tangential to the primary business of the firm. 158 A 1998 study of
litigators from five large law firms found that the dominant attitude among
lawyers was a kind of “ethical pragmatism,” which assumed that “the ‘real’
meaning of ethical rules was consistent with pragmatic concerns, even
when the letter of the rules was not.” 159
These findings suggesting the marginal relevance of formal rules are
also consistent with recent research reporting the limited impact of
partnership form on partner supervision and monitoring. In their 2005
study of 147 New York City law firms, Professors Scott Baker and
Kimberly Krawiec found that the move from a general partnership (GP) to
a limited liability partnership (LLP) 160 had no significant effect on
partners’ relationships with each other, including their willingness to pitch
in on matters or monitor each others’ work. 161 Instead, partners cited “a
concern with maintaining the firm’s reputation and maximizing the firm’s
billable rates” as the primary factors that motivate monitoring, and “the
size, decentralization, and specialization of the modern law firm” as the
These findings contradict the
primary factors that impede it. 162
conventional wisdom in legal ethics scholarship that the move to a limited
liability form will undermine internal supervision. 163
Finally, as discussed in Part I, we know that firms’ formal policies and

157. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
159. See Suchman, supra note 12, at 844 (using the rules governing deposition defense as
an example).
160. The main difference between a general partnership and a limited liability partnership
is that, in a limited liability partnership, “partners are liable only for debts stemming from
their own conduct, or the conduct of someone under their supervision” rather than the
conduct of all partners. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 11, at 110.
161. Id. at 146, 148 (reporting no significant effect on collegiality and no significant
impact on monitoring).
162. Id. at 148.
163. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure,
84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1728 (1998) (“[U]nlimited liability . . . arguably provides an important
assurance to clients that law firms will discipline shirking and other self-interested conduct
by their members.”); Allan W. Vestal, Special Ethical and Fiduciary Challenges for Law
Firms Under the New and Revised Unincorporated Business Forms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 445,
475 (1998) (noting that partners in an LLP “have less incentive to supervise than they would
in a general, nonlimited liability partnership setting”); David B. Wilkins, Making Context
Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1147, 1213 (1993)
(stating that partners in an LLP will have fewer incentives to monitor and “less opportunity
to detect and prevent misconduct”).
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procedures may have a minimal impact on lawyers’ day-to-day conduct,
especially if formal policies and procedures are inconsistent with informal
(cultural) expectations. 164 The study of big firm litigators, discussed
above, found that the structural controls in those firms seemed designed
primarily to symbolize that “‘ethicality matters to people like us,’” and that
there was no real threat of repercussions for “anything but the most
egregious of ethical failures.” 165 Instead, the study concluded that the
firms operate on the basis of a “logic of confidence [that] the firm’s ethical
health is ‘confirmed’ by the absence of negative feedback from control
structures that have been allowed to atrophy precisely because of a belief
that the firm is too ethically healthy to really need them.” 166
This is not to say that the existence of formal policies and procedures is
inconsequential. As with specialists, even merely symbolic policies and
procedures may be culturally significant.167 The extent to which formal
policies and procedures control lawyers’ day-to-day conduct cannot be
taken for granted, however, and must be examined empirically.
C.

Research Questions

Given the paucity of research to date on large firm lawyers’ ethical
attitudes and behavior, just about any additional research would make a
useful contribution. Except for the study of large firm litigators,168
Professor David Wilkins’ and my research on in-house compliance
specialists, 169 and Professor Susan Saab Fortney’s surveys of Texas
lawyers (some of whom worked in large law firms), 170 there has not been
any systematic research on how large firm lawyers think or act in different
regulatory and/or management contexts.
This lack of research is not unique to the large firm context. As
Professor Fred Zacharias has observed, “Hard evidence concerning
lawyers’ common behavior and reactions is virtually nonexistent . . . .
[T]he ethics codes and the scholarly literature are replete with empirical
164. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
165. Suchman, supra note 12, at 859.
166. Id.
167. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 12, at 713
(“[I]nstitutional theory draws a distinction between a firm with no formal policy, and one in
which the formal policy is inconsistent with actual conduct.”).
168. See Frenkel et al., supra note 45, at 701-02; Suchman, supra note 12, at 839-42
(explaining the research design of that study).
169. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at 561-62
(explaining our research design).
170. See Fortney, Law Firm Partners, supra note 47, at 275-78 (explaining her research
design); Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 49, at 243-45 (same).
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assumptions that require empirical testing and justification.”171
That being said, future research on lawyers’ ethics should take care to be
as specific as possible about: (1) the type of ethical issue or conduct of
interest; and (2) the type of lawyer of interest. More specificity would go a
long way toward breaking some of the seeming impasses in legal ethics
scholarship, and might improve the effectiveness of bar regulatory efforts.
1.

Type of Ethical Issue or Conduct

Different people mean different things when they talk about ‘ethics.’
Some people mean ‘morals,’ whereas others mean ‘topics covered by the
ethics rules,’ yet these are very different subjects. Some of the debate
between proponents and opponents of law firm regulation stems from a
lack of specificity about the type of ethical issue or conduct that is being
discussed.
Proponents of law firm discipline, in-house specialists, and other forms
of law firm regulation are primarily concerned about the quality of law firm
management. Probably no one would deny that the quality of management
has ethical implications, and Rule 5.1(a),172 governing supervision, clearly
implicates law firm management; but while proponents have mainly
structural concerns, and focus their attention on the firm as a whole,
opponents are concerned primarily about individual lawyers and their
personal sense of morality. This difference sometimes leads proponents
and opponents to talk past each other.
A lack of specificity about the type of conduct at issue also accounts for
some of the tension between the legalistic and institutional models of
lawyer regulation. Some types of knowing, egregious misconduct lend
themselves to legalistic treatment and a focus on enforcement. Lawyers
who make racist remarks while interviewing potential associates, 173 lie
about the existence of documents in discovery, 174 or steal money from
their clients and partners, 175 are knowingly violating widely-shared ethical

171. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 235 n.39
(1993).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2002).
173. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing racist and
sexist remarks made by a Baker & McKenzie partner while interviewing a University of
Chicago Law School student).
174. Id. at 2 (discussing the misconduct of a partner at Donovan, Leisure, Newton &
Irvine).
175. See Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by
Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 209-15 (1999) (discussing sixteen cases of billing
fraud by senior partners at prominent law firms); see also Thomas A. Kuczajda, Self-
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and legal norms—they are bad men, by most people’s standards—and are
unlikely to be responsive to cultural expectations for compliance. Thus,
some “ethically challenged lawyers”176 probably are beyond the reach of
soft, cultural controls. Other types of professional conduct may be more
susceptible to social cues, such as billing practices,177 or the acceptable
level of aggressiveness in discovery. 178 Future research should take care to
specify what type of individual or management conduct is at issue and what
mechanisms the researcher imagines will affect that conduct.
2.

Type of Lawyer

Large firm lawyers traditionally were thought to be more ethical than
small firm and solo practitioners,179 in part because they could afford to
be. 180 Whether this was ever true, or has become less true as large firm
practice has become more competitive, there is little evidence that the
process of ethical decision-making differs between large and small firm
lawyers. On the contrary, as the institutional model would predict, most
lawyers appear to make “ethical” decisions by investigating community
standards; that is, asking their officemates, friends, relatives or—
increasingly—inquiring on a listserv. 181
Lawyers’ professional communities differ, however, and those
differences may have profound effects on the way lawyers view and
resolve ethical issues, as well as the type of day-to-day conduct that they

Regulation, Socialization, and the Role of Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119,
121-26 (1998) (discussing billing fraud by the managing partner at Butler & Binion).
176. Creamer Comments, supra note 18.
177. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 912-20 (1999)
(explaining how large firm lawyers are socialized to pad their time sheets).
178. See Sarat, supra note 54, at 821-24 (discussing adversarial norms in discovery);
Suchman, supra note 12, at 853-54 (defining the “asshole attorney” as someone who crosses
the line between acceptable and unacceptable aggressiveness).
179. See Levin, Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 150, at 311-15 (critically reviewing
the evidence for this view).
180. See Suchman, supra note 12, at 865 (noting the effect of financial stability on
ethicality and quoting one partner as saying, “those who can afford ethics do it”).
181. See Levin, Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 150, at 362-67 (reporting how small
firm and solo practitioners solve ethical problems); Suchman, supra note 12, at 863 (quoting
one associate who said “you learn by osmosis; that is, by copying others”). See generally
Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace: The Impact of Legal Listservs on the Professional
Development and Ethical Decisionmaking of Lawyers, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 591 (2005)
[hereinafter Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace] (examining how members of the New York
State Trial Lawyers Association use their General Forum listserv to “form their
understanding of accepted conduct within their community of practice”).
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simply take for granted. 182 Future research should specify what type of
lawyer is being studied and the main professional community to which
such lawyers belong.
For instance, existing research finds that associates and partners have
different perspectives on their firms and different incentives for ethical
(and unethical) conduct. 183 Thus, one might expect that different forms of
law firm regulation would affect associates and partners differently. From
a legalistic perspective, law firm discipline has little importance for
associates, who are not liable for firm-wide supervision under Rule
5.1(a). 184 Law firm discipline might be culturally important—for instance,
it might change management expectations for associate conduct—but
presumably the cultural effects of law firm discipline would also differ for
associates and partners.
The role of specialists, likewise, may be different at different levels of
the law firm hierarchy. Specialists may be more attentive to partners’
concerns (like managing conflicts of interest) than the concerns of
associates. The Altman Weil survey found that in almost half of firms that
have in-house counsel, associates do not have access to them. 185 To
encourage questions from associates, some firms have created more than
one specialist; for instance, firm counsel (to handle conflicts and claims)
and an ombudsman (to be available to associates). 186 Associates may be
reluctant to raise questions about partners’ conduct, however, no matter
how the specialist’s role is defined. 187 Future research on specialists
should be attentive to this issue, and take care to specify the specialist’s
primary functional role within the firm.
Finally, future research should pay close attention to the age and career
path of lawyers being studied. Professor Levin finds that lawyers’ initial

182. See, e.g., Levin, Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 150, at 346-49 (discussing
ethically questionable but widespread office-sharing practices among solo and small firm
practitioners).
183. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
184. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2002) (referring to “[a] partner in
a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses
comparable managerial authority . . . .”).
185. See ALTMAN WEIL, 2005 SURVEY, supra note 77, at 7 (reporting that associates have
access to in-house counsel in only twenty-eight of fifty-three firms).
186. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Ideology of Firm Counsel, 84 N.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (discussing firms’ use of ombudsmen); see also Epstein, supra note 20,
at 1030-31, 1037 (noting that ethics committee members sometimes play the role of
ombudsmen).
187. See Robert L. Nelson, Uncivil Litigation: Problematic Behavior in Large Law
Firms, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Feb.-Mar. 1997, at 8, 24 (noting that associates may be reluctant to
come forward with questions about partners’ conduct).
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practice experiences play a powerful role in defining their “stock
responses” to ethical issues, 188 which suggests that lawyers’ initial practice
setting may profoundly affect their professional ideology. 189 Moreover,
she reports that “once lawyers choose a particular response to an ethical
issue . . . [they tend] not to reexamine the decision in the future.” 190 These
findings point to an intriguing process of ethical imprinting that, among
other things, may help explain lawyers’ (and scholars’) nostalgia for past
norms and practices. Close study of ideological differences among lawyers
of different ages, and same-age lawyers who start off in different practice
settings, could yield interesting findings.
3.

Compensation and Mobility

I conclude with two variables that deserve special mention in any selfrespecting subsection on research questions about lawyers’ ethics:
compensation and mobility. The importance of compensation is obvious:
not only do compensation systems affect the material rewards of practice,
they also send loud cultural messages about the type of conduct the firm
values. At the partnership level, the role of client origination credits191
and the system for compensating partners who invest in firm
management 192 directly shape partners’ incentives to manage the firm,
monitor their colleagues, and mentor junior lawyers. At the associate level,
what counts as “billable” likely has a significant effect. According to one
associate in the big firm litigation study, the best way to make large firm
lawyers more ethical would be to create a billing number for “time spent in
ethical give and take.” 193
The importance of mobility may be somewhat less obvious, but my

188. See Levin, Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 150, at 364-67, 376-80
(emphasizing the importance of “stock responses” for experienced lawyers).
189. See Nelson & Trubek, supra note 142, at 198-202 (emphasizing the importance of
the workplace in shaping lawyers’ professional ideologies); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up
from Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment, and the Practice of
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 955, 965 (1999) (suggesting the longer a lawyer stays at a firm,
the more influence the firm will have on her professional self-conception).
190. Levin, Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 150, at 379.
191. See Peter J. Winders, The Ideal Law Firm Compensation System, PROF. LAW.,
Summer 2005, at 1 (criticizing overemphasis on origination credits in partner compensation
formulae).
192. Id. at 6-8 (emphasizing the need to compensate lawyers who invest in firm
management); see also Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note 60, at
572-77 (emphasizing the importance of direct compensation on compliance specialists’ role
within firms); Jones & Leonard, supra note 73, at 5 (emphasizing the importance of
adequate compensation and the treatment of partners when they leave management roles).
193. Suchman, supra note 12, at 864.
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hypothesis is this: some of the current weakness of informal controls within
law firms 194 results not so much from their size as from the increasing
mobility of their members. Although firms have grown and some are
enormous, from an institutional perspective it is workplace or office culture
that is most immediate, rather than the “official” culture or selfunderstanding of the firm as a legal entity. Even big firms have smaller
offices, departments, and workgroups that can serve as the location of
cohesive professional communities.
Increased mobility, on the other hand, affects all offices and work
groups and appears to undermine group ties and the strength and salience
of the group norms. The big firm litigator study, for example, emphasized
lawyers’ derision for laterals, who were viewed as more likely to flout local
norms than lawyers native to the firm. 195 It would be interesting to
investigate whether firms (or offices, or practice areas) with higher attrition
or mobility tend to exhibit lower professional standards (assuming for the
moment that we can measure high and low) or less agreement about
standards than firms or offices with less mobility. It also would be
interesting to investigate where increasingly mobile and/or isolated lawyers
look for their professional community and sense of community norms.
Listservs? 196
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that nostalgia for an idealized collegial form has
prevented legal scholars and regulators from coming to terms with the
realities of practice in large law firms. Despite the many thousands of
lawyers who work in large law firms and large firms’ collective
institutional influence on the profession, the profession has yet to come up
with a credible strategy for self-regulation in the large firm context. We
need to do better. In the wake of recent accounting scandals and the
increasing threat of federal oversight, it is indefensible for the profession to
continue to look back a generation for its regulatory or managerial models.
It may be Arthur Andersen and KPMG today, 197 but it is likely to be one of
194. See Frenkel et al., supra note 45, at 704-05 (noting that most observers of the focus
groups with big firm litigators agreed that firm cultures seemed very weak); Suchman, supra
note 12, at 858-66 (remarking on the weakness of traditional informal controls).
195. See Suchman, supra note 12, at 868.
196. See Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace, supra note 181, at 591.
197. See, e.g., Judge Approves First Settlement of an Enron Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2003, at C4 (noting judicial approval of settlement where AWSC Societe Cooperative,
which used to include Arthur Anderson, would pay $40 million to plaintiff Enron investors
and former employees); Kathy M. Kristof & Josh Friedman, KPMG Tax Case Grows; Ten
More People Are Indicted over Alleged Fraudulent Shelters Promoted by the Firm, L.A.
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ours tomorrow. How will the public judge the debate about law firm
regulation in that context?

TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at C1 (reporting ten additional indictments in the prosecution of
KPMG).

